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Abstract 
The fiscal burden in OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development) countries more than doubles the overall 
taxation level in Latin American countries. In terms of revenue 
composition, OECD countries collect a larger share from direct taxes; 
there is also a greater component from social contributions. 
During the nineties, the revival of economic growth and the 
design of better tax systems enabled fiscal revenues to recover 
strongly, reaching an increase of 3 points of GDP (Gross Domestic 
Product). However, this effort has not been sufficient, considering the 
dynamics of public debt in an environment of high interest rates and 
low growth.  
In this paper, the main trends of tax burden and composition of  
tax revenues in Latin American countries are described, and then the 
short-term tax-gap, as OECD has defined it, are calculated for 18 
countries. The reversal of economic cycle makes impossible to fill this 
gap in the short term without significant macroeconomic costs. Some 
room of manoeuvre, namely a cyclical safety margin, has to be 
considered. 
The magnitude of this cyclical safety margin is very significant, 
because of the volatility of output and the high value of tax elasticities, 
despite the relatively minor size of public sector when compared to 
OECD standards. If fiscal policy is more efficient when letting operate 
automatic stabilisers, then “second generation” macro fiscal rules will 
have to address on the issue of the pronounced pro-cyclical bias that 
defined fiscal policies in the nineties in many Latin American 
countries. 
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Introduction 
The fiscal burden in OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development) countries more than doubles the overall 
taxation level in Latin American countries. In terms of revenue 
composition, OECD countries collect a larger share from direct taxes; also 
there is also a greater component from social contributions. However, 
during the last decade tax burden in Latin America increased significantly. 
The revival of economic growth and the design of better tax systems 
enabled fiscal revenues to recover strongly, reaching an increase of 3 
points of GDP (Gross Domestic Product). Revenue growth has been 
particularly notable in VAT (Value added tax), and to a lesser extent 
among direct taxes. In Latin America income and capital gains taxes show 
a relatively low collection level; its weight has fluctuated between 2% and 
3% of GDP. Although this feature is a structural weakness, major tax 
reforms have tended to favour duties easier to collect and with a larger tax 
base, reduce personal income tax highest marginal rates, and a reduction 
in the average corporate income tax rate, which have been compensated 
through an enlargement of the income tax base. The overall increase of 
effective tax rates evidence the need for greater funding from Latin 
American governments in the last decade. The efforts have been 
concentrated on the internal aspects of taxation (as well as those sources 
which are easier to collect). 
However, this effort has not been sufficient, considering the 
dynamics of public debt in an environment of high interest rates and low 
growth. Some countries of Latin America are once again facing an 
external debt crisis, mainly in the public sector this time. In addition of 
establishing consistent and credible anti-cyclical fiscal rules, these 
countries need an overall solution which includes sovereign debt 
restructuring mechanisms designed in a global context. 
Tax reforms and fiscal stabilisation in Latin American countries 
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In this paper, we first describe the main trends of tax burden and composition of  tax 
revenues in Latin American countries, and then we estimate some indicators to emphasize the 
magnitude of the problem. We calculate the short-term tax-gap, as OECD has defined it, for 18 
countries. This simple indicator of fiscal sustainability underlines the huge difference registered in 
the recent years between the primary surplus required to stabilize debt and the effective primary 
balance. Hence, fiscal adjustment cannot be avoided if financing conditions remain prohibitive. 
However, the reversal of economic cycle makes impossible to fill this gap in the short term without 
significant macroeconomic costs. Some room of manoeuvre, namely a cyclical safety margin, has to 
be considered, specially in the discussions with International Financial Institutions. 
We estimate the magnitude of this cyclical safety margin, which is very significant because 
of the volatility of output and the high value of income elasticity, despite the relatively minor size of 
public sector when compared to OECD standards. If fiscal policy is more efficient when letting 
operate automatic stabilizers, then “second generation” macro fiscal rules will have to address on 
the issue of the pronounced pro-cyclical bias that defined fiscal policies in the nineties in many 
Latin American countries. 
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II. Main features of tax systems and 
recent trends 
One of the main functions of taxes is to finance public spending 
on goods and services, therefore choosing a taxation level in some way 
is equivalent to choose a public spending level. Nonetheless, economic 
theory offers a very limited guide in relation to the optimal level of tax 
burden and revenue composition. Tanzi and Zee (2000) adopt an 
empirical approach, evaluating if the level and composition is 
"appropriate" by comparing the performance with other economies, 
taking into account the particularities of each country. If we compare 
the tax burden of OECD and Latin American countries, there is a great 
difference both in level and composition terms (see figure 1).  
Tax reforms and fiscal stabilisation in Latin American countries 
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Figure 1 
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF TAX REVENUES 1999 OR 2000 
(Percentage of
 GDP) 
Source: For OECD countries, "Revenue Statistics of OECD Member Countries” (OECD), 
2001. For Southeast Asia, “Government Finance Statistics” (FMI), 2000. For Latin-
American countries, ECLAC, based on official data.  
Note: Data for OECD countries and Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica and 
Ecuador correspond to General Government coverage. The others correspond to Central 
Government.  
For year 2000, the fiscal burden in OECD countries more than doubles the overall taxation 
level in Latin American countries. In terms of revenue composition, OECD countries collect a 
larger share from direct taxes; also there is a greater component from social contributions. In 
comparison to South-East countries, virtually there is no difference in the overall taxation level. 
However, in relative terms direct taxation is far more important than in Latin American countries. 
2.1 Tax burden and composition 
During the 1990's the tax burden in Latin America has increased significantly, on average 
(see figure 2). The revival of economic growth and design of better tax systems enabled fiscal 
revenues to recover strongly; 16 of the region’s countries managed to increase central government 
tax revenue (see figure 3). Between 1990 and 2000, including social contributions, the increase 
reached 3 points of GDP, while excluding social contributions then the rise is 2 points of GDP. On 
average, the region registers a tax pressure of the Central Government Sector equivalent to 15% of 
GDP for year 2000, and 15.8% for 2001. Revenue growth has been particularly notable in VAT, 
and to a lesser extent among direct taxes. Social security contributions display wide disparities, 
because several of the region’s countries reformed their pension system, which altered the public-
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Figure 2  
LATIN AMERICA, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TAX REVENUES 1980–2001 
(Percentage of GDP) 
Source: ECLAC, based on official data.  
Notes: For the period 1980-1989 there are no data available for Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador 
and Nicaragua. Some data for Social Security Contributions (SSC) do not correspond to 
Central Government coverage.  
 
Regional averages hide relevant differences between countries. These deviations are very 
significant in countries that show a larger weight in the relative share of social contributions such as 
Brazil, Colombia, Nicaragua, and Uruguay. For example, Brazil has a tax burden over 30% of GDP 
at the General Government level, even higher that the level registered for the United States, mainly 
explained by the high level of social security revenues. Argentina and Chile register numbers above 
average, reaching 20% of GDP, but in these countries the biggest part of social security is private. 
The income level of each country is also a variable that explains these differences; as shown in 
figure 4, the economies with a higher GDP per person have also a higher tax burden. 
The sharp differences among countries can also be observed in relation to the revenue 
composition. Some general trends are depicted in figure 5. In Latin America income and capital 
gains taxes show a low collection level. During the 1990's, its relative weight has fluctuated 
between 2% and 3% of GDP. Major tax reforms have tended to favour duties easier to collect and 
with a larger tax base (such as VAT); reduce personal income tax (PIT) highest marginal rates, as 
well as a reduction in the average corporate income tax (CIT) rate, which have been compensated 
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Figure 3  
LATIN AMERICA, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TAX REVENUES IN 1990 AND 2001 
(Percentage of GDP) 
Source: ECLAC, based on official data.  
 
 
Figure 4  
TAXES AND GDP PER CAPITA IN 2000 
(Percentage of GDP)
 
Source: ECLAC, based on official data. 
Notes: Tax revenues data include Social Security Contributions and correspond to General 
Government coverage for: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
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Figure 5  
TAX BURDEN AND COMPOSITION OF  TAX REVENUES IN LATIN AMERICA 
Simple average, percent of total (left axis) and percent of GDP (right axis) 
Source: ECLAC, based on official data. 
Notes: In some cases data of social security contributions do not correspond to central 
government level.  
 
Following the previous argument, the trend regarding PIT during the 1990's has been associated 
mainly with reducing the top marginal rates, increasing the lowest marginal rates, and the reduction in 
the number of taxable income brackets. Table 1 shows that since 1992 the average highest marginal 
rate has been reduced by six percentage points, while the average lowest rate has been increased by 
one point in the same period. The current structure is very different to the prevailing in the European 
Union, where PIT rates are significantly higher than in Latin America. 
At the beginning of the nineties, most countries in the Region used different CIT rates 
depending on the economic sector. This practice allowed Government some degree of responsibility 
over economic resource allocation, which was not compatible with a market economy and contributed 
to a less efficient tax administration. During the decade this situation has been reverted, observing a 
clear tendency towards unification in the CIT rates (see table 1), which accelerated in the second half 
of the decade. Currently, only three countries keep a differentiated structure for this tax: Honduras, 
Paraguay, and Venezuela, and they have reduced their differences over time. When considering the 
Region's average, the dispersion between the highest and lowest rate goes from 26 percentage points 
in 1992 to only 2 points in 2001. With this performance the CIT structure assimilates itself to 
international standards. 
Taxes on property have shown a systematic low collection; in 2000 the regional average was 
only 0.4% of GDP and adds up to a 2.9% of total government revenue. The only countries where 
this levy has a greater role is in Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia, even though the numbers registered 
are not of great importance in the general structure of total government revenues. Explaining this 
condition could be the fact that most collection of property taxes are performed at the local 
government level, where tax administration capacities and inspection schemes are still very 
underdeveloped. There are several failures which undermine the local government collection 
capacity such as: the auto evaluation system by the owner, which incentives to declare a lower 
value of the property being assessed; the infrequent revaluation of unitary costs; the deficiencies 
and difficulties to create and keep updated the property cadastre; the ample range of excepted 
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 ECLAC, based on official data.  
Notes:
 Data for Argentina and Colombia correspond to 1999. 
Table 1  
INCOME TAX RATES FOR CORPORATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS 
(Percentage) 
Corporations Individuals 
1992 Dec. 2002 1992 Dec. 2002  
Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max 
Argentina 20 20 35 35 15 30 9 35 
Bolivia 0 0 25 25 10 10 13  13 
Brazil 25 40 15  15  10 25 15 27.5 
Chile 15 35 16 16 5 50 5 40  
Colombia 30 30 35 35 5 30 0.13 22.92 
Costa Rica 30 30 30 30 10 25 10 15 
Ecuador 0 44.4 25 25 10 25 5 25 
El Salvador 0 25 25 25 10 30 10 30 
Guatemala 12 34 31 31 4 34 15 31 
Honduras 0 40.2 15 25 12 40 10 25 
Mexico 0 35 32 32 3 35 3  32  
Nicaragua 0 35.5 30 30 8 35.5 10 25 
Panama 2.5 45 30 30 3.5 56 4 30 
Paraguay 0 30 25   30  0 0 0 0 
Peru 0 30 27 27 6 37 15 27 
Dominican Republic 0 49.3 25 25 3 70 15 25 
Uruguay 0 30 30 30 0 0 0 0 
Venezuela 20 67.7 15  34  10 30 6 34 
Average Latin America  8.6 34.5 25.3 27.2 6.9 31.3 8.1 24.9 
Average European Union  36.4 37.9 32.0 35.4 17.1 53.0 18.6 47.6 
Source:
 Tanzi (2000) and Centro Interamericano de Administraciones Tributarias (CIAT). 
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Given the context of simplification and generalization of income tax, and the trade 
liberalization, which was accompanied by a reduction in trade tariffs, it was necessary for the 
countries of the region to search new ways to compensate the revenue reduction. The most appealed 
way to compensate was the wide introduction of value-added tax (VAT). In the 1960's Brazil and 
Uruguay were pioneers in the Region to introduce VAT in their tax codes; in the 1970's Argentina, 
Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru followed suit; and in the 1980's 
the rest of the countries of the Region began implementing it, with the exception of Jamaica, El 
Salvador, Paraguay, and Venezuela, which adopt it in the 1990's. 
The literature has amply reviewed the reasons to implement VAT as a major collection 
source. It should be stressed its wide tax base; tax neutrality in inter-temporal, international and 
national terms; and its relatively easy collection method, which compensates the management 
problems encountered by tax administrations. Compared with the previous sales tax, VAT has 
several advantages, such as generating information flows along the production, distribution, and 
sales process, which alleviates the tax auditing work. Also, the tax credit-debit mechanism 
generates incentives for complete tax returns by taxpayers, thereby reducing the needs for tax 
control. 
Since its introduction, VAT has acquired a great importance becoming the main source of tax 
collection in the Region. Its relative weight has increased from 19.6% in 1990 to 31% in 2000; 
VAT collection in relation to GDP reached in 2000 a 4.4%. The countries that depend heaviest on 
VAT are Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, which show a VAT tax burden above 7% of GDP, and 
rates that are specially higher compared to the rest of Latin American countries.1 The main 
differences registered in the region relate to the tax base. For example, in some countries VAT is 
imposed generally on goods and services, other countries use as tax base all goods and some 
services, while some countries impose it only on goods. Nevertheless, the general trend has been to 
extend the tax base over time, leaving the least number of exceptions possible. Some differences 
can also be registered in the number of rates implemented, since in some countries there are 
different rates for some types of goods consumed, as is the case of Argentina, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Panama.  
The VAT basic rates have registered a generalized increase in the decade (see table 2), 
actually between 1994 and 2001 all the countries have increased or maintain the VAT rates. On 
average, the rates have grown in two percentage points. However, on the other hand the VAT 
compliance (measured as VAT collected in per cent of VAT rate multiplied by Final Private 
Consumption) is still relatively low in comparison to other countries, for 2001 the regional average 
VAT compliance reached only 53.2%. 
Another outstanding trend has been the propensity to reduce multiple rates, where 
governments seek to achieve greater social equity by imposing lower rates to certain categories of 
highly demanded social products. The downside is that such structure creates higher administration 
costs, and incentives to generate greater tax evasion and elusion. 
2.2 Estimation of VAT compliance and tax expenditures 
Reducing tax evasion involves several benefits in terms of tax efficiency (whether the tax 
increases or reduces the overall welfare of those who are taxed) and tax equity (if the tax is fair to 
similar taxpayers), since compliant taxpayers are in disadvantage in comparison to tax evaders. 
Furthermore, the reduction of tax evasion would increase tax collection and improve resource 
allocation. In the case of VAT, there are several mechanisms used to evade file returns which sub-
                                                                
1
  The numbers for Argentina and Brazil are referred to General Government level. For Argentina, VAT is “co-participated” which 
means that federal and regional governments share revenues from this tax. In Brazil, the “ICMS” tax is collected –and spent- by 
regional Governments. 
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declare the debits or over-declare the credits. In all tax evasion analysis it must be considered that 
VAT evasion carries together income tax evasion, due to the fact that sub-declaring sales (or over-
declaring purchases) reduces the corporate or personal income tax base. 
Estimating VAT compliance does not allow to account separately tax evasion, elusion, and 
tax expenditures. Figure 7 and Table 2 show the VAT compliance for 18 countries on year 2001. 
The regional average is 53.2% of the relevant tax base, namely private final consumption. However, 
the results are diverse; four countries have a record below 40% and five countries exhibit a tax 
compliance above 60%. 
Table 2  
VAT RATES AND COMPLIANCE 
(Percentage) 
  VAT Rates VAT compliance 
 Initial year 1992a/ 1994b/ 1997c/ 2002d/ 1992 1994 1997 2001 
Argentina e/ 1975 18 18 21 21  67.1 60.6 52.4 
Bolivia 1973 14.92 14.92 14.92 13 31.5 40.6 50.2 49.3 
Brazil e/ 1967 20.48 20.48 20.48 20.48 43.3 63.8 57.8 71.0 
Colombia 1975 12 14 16 16 46.0 44.4 46.1 39.8 
Costa Rica 1975 8 8 15 13 77.5 69.4 47.1 55.6 
Chile 1975 18 18 18 18 74.5 71.9 68.9 69.8 
Ecuador 1970 10 10 10 12 44.5 49.3 58.6 86.5 
El Salvador 1992 10 10 13 13 46.5 56.2 52.6 51.5 
Guatemala 1983 7 7 10 12 44.6 43.0 48.2 50.1 
Honduras 1976 7 7 7 12 62.6 69.9 83.4 61.9 
Mexico 1980 10 10 15 15 37.7 37.9 31.9 34.3 
Nicaragua 1975 10 10 15 15 24.7 33.3 26.4 32.3 
Panama 1977 5 5 5 5 63.7 69.0 69.7 53.9 
Paraguay 1993 10 10 10 10 23.2 45.0 53.7 51.7 f/ 
Peru 1976 18 18 18 16 27.1 46.4 51.8 50.6 f/ 
Dominican R. 1983 6 6 8 12 42.5 32.3 46.9 64.5 
Uruguay 1972 ... ... ... 23 … …  42.7 
Venezuela 1993 ... 10 16.5 15.5 … 29.0 39.6 39.8 
Average  11.4 11.8 13.7 14.4 46.0 51.1 52.6 53.2 
Source: Tanzi (2000) for rate information of 1992 and 2000, CIAT for rate information of 2002. 






, where VATc represents VAT collection; VATr represents VAT rate; and PFC represents Private 
Final Consumption. 
a/ July of 1992. b/ March of 1994. c/ June of 1997. d/ December of 2002. e/ VAT collection correspond to State 
Governments level. f/ 2000 
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VAT COMPLIANCE IN 2001 
(Percentage) 
Source:
 Calculations of the authors based on data from ECLAC.  
Note:
 Collection VAT data for Argentina and Brazil correspond to General Government 
coverage. Data for Panama and Paraguay correspond to 2000.  
 
Tax expenditures are fiscal instruments which governments use as an alternative to direct 
spending. However, because of its nature it has several problems: horizontal inequity; lack of 
budgetary control; fiscal transparency problems; and management difficulties, and are defined as 
the amount of income that Government does not receive for giving a tax treatment which deviates 
from the general tax law. Tax expenditures are aimed at benefiting, promoting, or encourage certain 
activities, sector, region or group of taxpayers. Usually they take the form of exemptions or tax 
deductions, differentiated tax rates, and accelerated depreciation. Tax expenditure seeks to promote 
certain types of consumption or "desirable" activities. The never-ending question on these matters is 
whether it is possible to achieve better results and lower costs at promoting these behaviours in a 
more targeted way through specific programs. 
The surveys on tax expenditures in Latin America show that the magnitude of tax 
expenditure is high; estimations range from 7.4% of GDP in Colombia to 1.5% of GDP in Brazil 
(see Table 3). Depending on the country there is a different emphasis through which channel tax 
incentives are granted. In the case of Chile and Brazil tax expenditures rely heavily on direct taxes, 
while Argentina, Colombia, and Uruguay use in a greater proportion indirect taxes. A caveat must 
be made in relation to the above estimations, since there is great heterogeneity in the methodology 
and coverage used by each country. According to Simonit (2002) the majority of Latin American 
countries opted for the ex-post method to estimate tax expenditures. 
Tax reforms and fiscal stabilisation in Latin American countries 
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Table 3 









indirect taxes Country Year 
(% of GDP) (% of total) (% of total) 
Argentina 2001 3.0 29 64 
 2002 3.1   
Brazil 2001 1.5 66 17 
Chile 1998 3.8 71 29 
 2001 4.4   
Colombia 1998 7,4 35 65 
Guatemala 2001 2.0   
Mexico 2002 5.3 51 49 
Peru 2003 1.9 10 90 
Uruguay 1999 6.6 20 76 
Source: Simonit (2002) and ECLAC based on official information. 
2.3 Evolution of effective tax rates 
As was mentioned in the previous section, tax revenue increased by 3% during the decade. It is 
important to highlight what are the origins for such increase. This analysis is based on the indicators 
proposed by Mendoza et al. (1994), adapting them to the national accounts data and tax collection 
information available, as performed by the European Commission in 2001.2 The estimations on the 
effective tax rate on consumption, labour, and capital show the tax structure underlying trends, as well 
as the existing differences in these rates among countries.  
The indicators proposed by Mendoza et al. link tax revenue to the relevant national accounts 
items. The Effective Tax Rate on Capital (K) shows the relationship between taxes on property, 
capital gains, and corporate income tax to the net operating surplus of the overall economy. The 
Effective Tax Rate on Labour (L) shows the relationship between taxes levied on the work force and 
social security contributions to the wages and salaries of dependent employees. Finally, the Effective 
Rate on Consumption (C) compares VAT and excise taxes to private and public consumption. 
Using the above methodology it can be shown on Figure 8 that during the decade there is an 
increase in the effective tax rates on consumption (+1.9 percentage points), labour (+3.8 percentage 
points), and capital (+1.2 percentage points). These trends evidence that changes in the tax structure 
detailed in previous sections were not driven by changes in the relevant tax bases, but rather by 
changes in the tax rates affecting each economic factor. 
In comparison to the European Union, the regional averages for K, L, and C are substantially 
lower. While the regional average rate on consumption is 60% of the one registered in the European 
Union, the biggest difference is registered on work related costs (CL in the graph) where the 
European Union average is seven times higher than the Latin American average. Disaggregating 
labour costs shows that effective tax rates on work related costs explained only 20% of the effective 
rate on labour, and that they remained relatively stable along the decade (around 2%), while non-
work related costs have increased by two percentage points. This increase can be mostly explained 
by the social security reforms implemented. 
                                                                
2
  The effective rates of consumption include the 19 countries included of the Region. For the rest of the indicators there is full 
information available from Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, El Salvador, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru. 
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Figure 8  
EFFECTIVE TAX RATES, 1990-2000 
(Percentage) 
Source: Calculations of the author based on data from ECLAC. 
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A country breakdown of L shows great differences on the non-work related labour costs. 
Brazil exhibits the highest contribution on this category (33.3% in 2000). However, on the work 
related labour costs there are no significant differences among countries. Indirect taxation shows the 
highest effective tax rates, reaching above 12% from 1997 to 2000. Even though VAT taxes are the 
most important revenue in the Region, there are still strong differences between countries. Finally, 
effective tax rates on capital show a relevant increase, probably related to the simplification of 
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III. Tax stabilization in Latin America 
Despite the substantial progress of tax systems in the last 
decade, there remain crucial issues that will have to be addressed in the 
near future. In general terms, the situation is puzzling: the deceleration 
of economic growth and the reversion of capital flows has deteriorated 
the public finance situation, especially in terms of refinancing debt at 
reasonable interest rates. In this condition, the “tax gap” is significant 
in some cases, as it is shown in the next calculations. 
3.1 The need for fiscal adjustment (once 
again) 
The economic reform process since the eighties has implied a 
reduction of the weight of the cycle in the economy, when measuring 
public sectors as a whole. Nevertheless, the public spending of the 
Central (and General) Government grew four points of GDP during the 
1990s: from 16.6% of GDP in 1990 to 20.7% in 2001. The reasons of 
this dynamics are diverse, but we can identify at least four structural 
sources of spending:  
• There may be a positive association, as Rodrik (1998) has 
stressed, between more open economies and government 
consumption. In the case in Latin America, this seems to be the 
case in the nineties, as shown in figure 9. The usual explanation 
is that the Government has a function of isolation of the 
economy against external volatility. 
• The decentralization process in some countries (Brazil, Colombia, 
Argentina) has ensured sub-national “spending rights”, but not the 
corresponding financing; 
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• The social security reforms have been significant, both in the destabilizing process of 
privatization of pension funds in Chile, Peru, Argentina and Chile, and in the 
generalization of “social security rights” in Brazil and Colombia;  
• The “snowball effect” of public debt has risen. Real interest rates on public-sector debt 
have been much higher than economic growth rates, particularly in recent years, and this 
has endangered public-sector solvency. As a result, a large and often growing proportion 
of fiscal revenues has been absorbed by interest payments in some countries, like 
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica and Ecuador (see figure 10). This problem is 
magnified with the very high proportion of liabilities that are set in US dollars. The 
countries of Latin America cannot borrow in domestic money abroad, phenomenon that is 
known as “the original sin” (see, for example, Céspedes, Chang and Velasco, 2002). 
Figure 9 
RELATION BETWEEN OPENNESS AND PUBLIC SPENDING, 1990-2001 














The target of stabilizing or reducing public debt has proven to be very difficult in the context 
of highly volatile growth rates, exchange rates and interest rates. One way to look at the magnitude 
of this problem is to estimate the so-called ex-post short-term tax gap (see Blanchard /et al./, 1990), 
which is the primary surplus (or deficit, in few cases) that the public sector needs to stabilize its 
debt at the previous level. In table 6 we make these estimations for 19 countries of Latin America.3 
In some of them (Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Paraguay, Peru) there is a systematic 
negative difference between effective and required primary balance, which results in a dangerous 
dynamic of debt accumulation. A combined process of systematic generation of primary surplus and 
of enhancement of financing conditions seem to be the only way to ensure medium term 
sustainability of public debt. 
                                                                
3 
 Blanchard et al. (1990) estimate also medium-term tax-gap indicators forecasting the path of crucial variables as output, government 
consumption and transfers for each OECD country. The intention here is simply to highlight the importance of macroeconomic 
conditions in public debt dynamics, and not to estimate the exact situation of sustainability in Latin American countries. 
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Figure 10 
LATIN AMERICA: DEBT INTEREST PAYMENTS 
(Percentage of GDP)
 
A. 1990-1991 Average 
 
B. 2000-2001 Average 
Source: ECLAC.  
Notes: Institutional coverage: Central Government. DIP means Debt Interest 
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3.2 The pro-cyclical bias of fiscal policy: evidence for Latin 
America 
In a context of fiscal programming with an annual horizon and public revenues that closely 
follow the macroeconomic cycle, targeting the short-term deficit rather than the structural deficit 
has given rise to pro-cyclical public expenditure policies. In Latin American countries, during the 
nineties, many positive but transitory episodes were considered as permanents, while the negative 
ones were usually considered as short-lived. This behaviour has produced in some countries a 
accumulation of public debt ratio even in periods were output growth was above trend. In the future, 
it seems crucial to face this “optimistic bias” with explicit norms to ensure consistent and 
transparent fiscal policy. 
Graphically, the asymmetry of discretionary fiscal policies can be shown comparing the 
changes in the cyclically adjusted balance with the output gap, measured as a percentage of trend 
GDP.4 If automatic stabilizers had operated symmetrically, in the sense that discretional policies are 
neutral in the cycle, the dots would be distributed along the X-axis. In the case of anti-cyclical 
policies, dots should be found in bottom-left and top-right quadrants. If dots concentrate in top-left 
and bottom-right quadrants, discretional policies are pro-cyclical. 
In Latin America (figure 11), the analysis of 45 episodes of changes of the global cyclically-
adjusted balance (CAB) reveals that 12 of them were neutral;5 in 25 cases fiscal policy had a pro-
cyclical behaviour, and in only 8 the result was counter cyclical. More precisely, in thirteen of the 
seventeen episodes in which GDP grew above its trend the change in CAB was negative, reflecting 
an expansionary fiscal policy. 
Table 4 
TAX GAP INDICATOR  
(Percentage of GDP) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Argentina Primary balance -0.2 -1.3 0.5 0.5 -0.1 1.3 0.2 1.4 
 Required Primary balance 2.5 -0.3 -0.9 0.9 4.2 3.7 6.0 7.6 
 Difference -2.8 -1.0 1.4 -0.4 -4.3 -2.5 -5.8 -6.2 
 Debt Stock Variation 2.4 1.9 -1.2 3.1 5.4 2.1 8.7 80.6 
Bolivia Primary balance 0.9 0.9 -1.0 -1.4 -2.1 -2.9 -4.9 -5.7 
 Required Primary balance -2.0 -1.6 -1.7 -1.6 1.3 0.1 1.4 0.4 
 Difference 2.9 2.5 0.7 0.3 -3.4 -3.0 -6.2 -6.1 
 Debt Stock Variation -4.3 -9.0 -6.7 -1.3 3.1 0.1 7.4 5.7 
Brazil Primary balance -2.4 -0.7 0.3 0.8 2.4 2.1 2.4 2.7 
 Required Primary balance 1.7 1.3 1.0 5.7 5.3 2.0 2.8 2.2 
 Difference -4.1 -2.0 -0.7 -4.8 -2.9 0.2 -0.5 0.6 
 Debt Stock Variation 0.4 2.6 2.8 6.3 5.1 0.9 1.8 2.8 
Chile Primary balance 3.0 2.6 2.2 1.0 -1.0 0.6 0.2 -0.5 
 Required Primary balance -1.7 -0.8 -0.6 0.2 0.4 -0.1 0.1 0.0 
 Difference 4.8 3.4 2.8 0.8 -1.4 0.7 0.1 -0.5 
 Debt Stock Variation -7.6 -4.4 -2.1 -0.2 1.0 -0.6 2.3 0.3 
                                                                
4
  Recent studies have shown that there was also a pro-cyclical bias in EMU countries before the Maastricht Treaty (See for example 
European Commission, 2001). We use here the same methodology.  
5
  The episodes where there were no significant changes in the CAB even with huge changes of the output gap are: Colombia (99-00), 
Chile (92-98), Bolivia (94-00), Brazil (90-94), Guatemala (92-00), El Salvador (93-00), Mexico (95-97), Panama (92-00), Paraguay 
(93-98), Peru (94-00), Dominican Republic (90-96 and 97-00). 
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Table 4 (continuation) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Colombia Primary balance -1.9 -2.9 -2.4 -2.4 -4.3 -2.1 -2.4 -2.9 
 Required Primary balance 0.6 1.6 1.5 2.8 4.1 3.2 3.4 3.1 
 Difference -2.5 -4.5 -3.9 -5.2 -8.4 -5.3 -5.8 -6.0 
 Debt Stock Variation 0.0 2.0 0.8 5.2 6.7 7.8 8.4 0.4 
Costa Rica Primary balance 0.8 0.6 0.9 0.7 1.4 0.6 1.1 0.3 
 Required Primary balance 3.3 4.4 2.1 0.8 0.6 2.8 3.7 3.2 
 Difference -2.5 -3.8 -1.3 -0.1 0.8 -2.2 -2.6 -2.9 
 Debt Stock Variation 0.9 4.9 -2.7 8.8 -3.7 1.7 1.7 1.4 
Ecuador Primary balance 1.9 1.4 3.3 -0.1 4.7 7.6 3.2 3.1 
 Required Primary balance -0.7 0.0 -0.6 1.6 8.2 1.1 -1.0 -0.5 
 Difference 2.6 1.4 3.9 -1.7 -3.4 6.5 4.2 3.6 
 Debt Stock Variation -13.0 -1.0 -3.8 4.7 35.4 -17.7 -16.3 -8.3 
El Salvador Primary balance 0.8 -0.2 0.2 -0.7 -0.9 -0.9 -3.0 -1.6 
 Required Primary balance -2.6 0.4 -1.0 -0.6 -0.2 0.5 0.4 0.5 
 Difference 3.4 -0.6 1.2 -0.1 -0.7 -1.4 -3.5 -2.1 
 Debt Stock Variation 1.1 -9.1 -6.3 -7.7 0.1 0.8 2.0 -3.5 
Guatemala Primary balance 0.5 1.2 0.0 -1.1 -1.5 -0.5 -0.5 0.0 
 Required Primary balance 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.8 0.7 1.0 -0.3 
 Difference 0.3 0.4 -0.2 -1.5 -2.3 -1.2 -1.5 0.3 
 Debt Stock Variation -2.2 0.2 0.0 -0.1 2.9 -0.1 0.5 -1.2 
Haiti Primary balance -4.1 -1.6 0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -1.7 -2.5 -2.4 
 Required Primary balance --- --- -0.7 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 0.6 0.8 
 Difference --- --- 0.9 0.2 -0.1 -1.4 -3.1 -3.2 
 Debt Stock Variation --- --- --- --- -0.6 -1.2 -3.4 6.6 
Honduras Primary balance -2.8 -2.6 -2.1 -1.8 -4.2 -5.7 -4.7 -3.7 
 Required Primary balance 0.3 0.3 -0.7 0.2 3.3 -2.1 -0.6 -1.3 
 Difference -3.1 -2.9 -1.4 -2.0 -7.5 -3.7 -4.2 -2.4 
 Debt Stock Variation -7.6 -4.8 -1.9 -7.6 4.5 -7.5 -4.6 2.0 
Mexico Primary balance 3.2 3.5 2.5 1.1 1.6 2.0 2.2 0.8 
 Required Primary balance 5.2 1.9 1.5 1.2 2.2 1.5 3.0 2.4 
 Difference -2.0 1.6 1.0 -0.2 -0.6 0.5 -0.8 -1.6 
 Debt Stock Variation 11.9 -4.1 -4.9 0.5 -0.1 -2.7 0.2 -0.2 
Nicaragua 1/ Primary balance 3.6 1.5 3.5 2.9 -2.1 -4.3 -7.7 --- 
 Required Primary balance -17.2 -17.9 -7.7 -9.2 -21.0 -15.7 -4.5 --- 
 Difference 20.9 19.4 11.2 12.0 18.9 11.4 -3.1 --- 
 Debt Stock Variation -66.3 -184.2 105.7 -14.4 -23.8 -20.2 -4.6 --- 
Panama Primary balance 3.8 3.0 2.8 -1.4 1.7 3.2 2.7 2.2 
 Required Primary balance 1.7 1.2 -0.6 -0.4 1.2 2.3 4.2 3.8 
 Difference 2.1 1.8 3.4 -1.0 0.5 0.9 -1.5 -1.6 
 Debt Stock Variation -2.7 20.9 -4.2 -1.2 6.0 -4.6 6.2 -21.6 
Paraguay Primary balance 0.6 0.5 -0.1 0.7 -1.9 -1.9 0.9 -0.8 
 Required Primary balance 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.8 0.8 1.3 0.7 1.4 
 Difference 0.2 0.1 -0.4 -0.1 -2.7 -3.2 0.2 -2.3 
 Debt Stock Variation 2.8 -0.3 0.6 2.6 8.1 5.0 3.3 10.1 
Peru Primary balance 0.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 -1.0 -0.6 -0.7 -0.2 
 Required Primary balance -1.3 1.2 -1.3 2.0 1.7 0.8 2.1 -0.4 
 Difference 1.3 -0.2 2.2 -1.2 -2.8 -1.3 -2.7 0.1 
 Debt Stock Variation -5.6 -2.7 -13.3 8.4 6.8 -1.8 -0.3 2.2 
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Table 4 (concluded) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Dominican R. Primary balance 2.1 0.5 1.4 1.1 0.0 1.8 1.2 1.1 
 Required Primary balance -0.7 -1.9 -1.8 -1.2 -1.2 -0.8 0.3 0.3 
 Difference 2.8 2.4 3.3 2.4 1.3 2.6 0.9 0.9 
 Debt Stock Variation -4.2 -4.9 -4.9 -1.4 -1.4 -2.1 0.7 1.4 
Uruguay Primary balance -0.6 -0.6 -0.2 0.2 -2.0 -2.0 -1.9 -0.6 
 Required Primary balance --- --- --- --- --- 2.5 3.5 4.6 
 Difference --- --- --- --- --- -4.5 -5.4 -5.3 
 Debt Stock Variation --- --- --- --- --- 5.3 6.9 38.6 
Venezuela Primary balance -0.6 -11.7 -6.5 1.3 -3.8 -7.3 1.0 -3.9 
 Required Primary balance --- --- -0.3 2.7 4.8 1.9 2.6 7.4 
 Difference --- --- -6.2 -1.4 -8.6 -9.2 -1.6 -11.3 
 Debt Stock Variation --- --- -11.0 -3.1 -1.3 -1.1 2.6 9.2 
Source: Calculation of the authors based on data from ECLAC. Coverage for Primary Balance is Central Government. 
Coverage for Public Debt is Central Government except Brazil (Federal Government and Central Bank), Honduras (Public 
Sector), Paraguay, Uruguay and Dominican Republic (only external debt of Central Government).   
Notes: The Required Primary Balance was calculated multiplying the difference between the public debt implicit interest 
rate and the real growth rate of the economy with public debt stock of the previous period. The “Difference” corresponds to 
the difference between the effective Primary Balance and the Required Primary Balance.  
1/ Results presented here for Nicaragua can be explained by high levels of debt stock and low levels of interest payments. 
When the economies grew below GDP trend, the change in CAB was positive in twelve of 
the sixteen episodes, with a restrictive fiscal policy.6 The conclusions are similar when the analysis 
is made in terms of cyclically-adjusted primary balance. These exercises show the usual behaviour 
of fiscal authorities in Latin America, which is not very different of other countries when there is no 
counter-cyclical rule. 
Figure 11  
PRO-CYCLICAL EPISODES IN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, 1990-2001  
Source: Calculations of the authors based on data from ECLAC.  
Note: CAGB: Cyclically-adjusted global balance. The graph only includes episodes 
where over at least two years the absolute values of the annual average output gap and 
of the annual average change in the cyclically-adjusted global balance was bigger than 
0.25% of trend GDP.  
                                                                
6
  In this case, countries had to adjust anyway, what we can call a result more than a policy.  
y = -0.2721x - 0.1029
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The countries that gained degrees of freedom during the nineties by diminishing its public 
debt are better prepared today to deal with the reversion of the cycle. As it can be seen in figure 12, 
the dispersion of the values of the sovereign debt spread within Latin American countries is quite 
striking, reflecting the fact that financial contagion is somewhat under control.7 The market is able 
to discriminate, essentially on the basis of the public debt stock. 
Figure 12 




Figure 13 compares, for the 45 episodes analyzed, the position of the economies in the cycle 
with the changes in public debt at the Central Government level. We can identify 15 anti-cyclical 
episodes, where the “dividend of growth” was spent in the reduction of public debt: Chile (1992-
98), Ecuador (1991-98), Peru (1994-2000), Mexico (1990-94 and 1998-2001) and Venezuela (1991-
93 and 1997-98). Other periods of public debt reduction occurred with a negative output gap, 
especially in Dominican Republic (1990-96), Uruguay (1990-91) and Paraguay (1990-91). In 
various episodes public debt grew heavily in good periods, which explains the recent difficulties (or 
even collapse) of public finance. The cases of Argentina (from 1993) and Uruguay are very clear. 
To a lesser extent, Brazil (1995-98), Colombia (1994-98), Costa Rica (98-01) and Paraguay (1993-
98) did not manage to control debt dynamics in the context of positive output gaps. 
The complete absence of symmetry in the management of public finance is noteworthy. For 
example, the countries that succeeded to reduce public debt in good times did not permit a debt- 
smoothing path in bad times. This is a behaviour that is inverse of what is found in the literature, 
some kind of “surplus bias”. In order to ensure credibility, the fiscal authorities tend to eliminate the 
operation of automatic fiscal stabilizers, even when there are no debt problems.8 
                                                                
7
  This is only one indicator; the reversion of capital flows to the region is widespread, see ECLAC (2002). 
8
  In some countries, even the concept of automatic stabilizers is inverse: once the target of public balance is set, any reduction of fiscal 
incomes are immediately corrected by expenditure cuts, in order to guarantee the stabilization of the economy!  
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GDP GAP AND CHANGE IN PUBLIC DEBT STOCK, 1990-2001 
(Percentage) 
Source: Calculations of the authors based on data from ECLAC. 
Note: The graph only includes episodes where over at least two years the absolute 
values of the annual average output gap and of the annual average change in public 
debt stock was bigger than 0.25% of trend GDP. 
The pro-cyclical reflex is not only usual in expansions; many times the target of public 
balance is more important than output growth in the context of IMF-supported programs in Latin 
America.9 The recent experience of Chile10 has shown that it is possible to make tax smoothing by 
accepting higher than expected deficits without loosing market credibility. Of course, this premium 
is explained by the very low stock of public debt in the country. 
These simple calculations show that dynamic consistency of fiscal policy is not spontaneous, 
even with the strong hypothesis of responsible discretionality. But the need for transparency is 
growing. In the recent debate of OECD countries the norm of the free operation of automatic 
stabilizers is widely accepted for the conduct of fiscal policy (see, for example, OECD, 2000, EMU, 
2002, Heller, 2002). For Latin American countries, ECLAC (1998) has recommended the use of a 
structural indicator of public balance for the orientation of fiscal policy. More recently, the World 
Bank is promoting the adoption of cyclically adjusted rules for the conduct of fiscal policy, in order 
to enhance the credibility of the countries of the region. A traditional argument against this type of 
rules in developing countries is that it is necessary to obtain fiscal equilibrium before adopting 
counter-cyclical criteria. Nevertheless, it should not be imperative to complete fiscal consolidation 
to introduce at least indicators that can harmonize medium term sustainability with the remotion of 
the pro-cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy, especially in good times. The definition of the structural 
target depends essentially on the stock of public debt and the magnitude of contingent liabilities, 
and remains a domestic debate. 
The problem is not only to set rigid fiscal targets of deficit or debt. Fiscal rules that sets only 
numerical targets, what we could call first generation rules, does not remove the pro-cyclical 
                                                                
9
  This is not indeed the issue of this paper. However, readers can find interesting discussions concerning structural conditionality and 
the effects of fiscal adjustments in the IMF web site. 
10
  The rule of a structural fiscal surplus of 1% of GDP adopted in 2000 defines public expenditure growth in terms of output trend, 
isolating this way the expenditure program from transitory fluctuations of fiscal incomes. This anti-cyclical design of fiscal policy is 
possible because of the systematic reduction of public debt during the nineties. 
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behaviour, as the recent experience in most Latin American countries has shown.11  If the purpose of 
fiscal rules is to ensure the dynamic consistency of fiscal policy, reducing debt in good times and hence 
permitting Governments to access to debt at a reasonable interest rate in recessive periods, “second 
generation” fiscal rules has to include medium term programming, prudent macroeconomic assumptions 
and some explicit treatment of the “dividend of growth”, the destination of public incomes when they 
are superior to the initial budget programming.12 
Hence, fiscal rules in the Latin American context requires substantial institutional developments, 
especially of the capacity to transform sensitivity analysis of the effects of crucial macroeconomic 
variables in routine budgeting procedures within the administration. Any fiscal rule has to take into 
account three main aspects: a medium term target (and the path to meet it), exception clauses when there 
are unforeseen macroeconomic fluctuations, and some room of manoeuvre for dealing with persistent 
recessive situations (see Buti, Franco and Ongena, 1997 for a discussion). 
3.3 The cyclical safety margin of fiscal balance  
Variation in a component of public income or expenditure is cyclical when it is due to the 
difference between the observed product and the trend product. In the OECD methodology (Giorno et al. 
1995), the deficit is broken down into a cyclical component and a structural one. The GDP gap is 
calculated as a percentage of the potential GDP, so that the cyclical balance is positive when the 
effective GDP is greater than the trend GDP and negative when it is smaller than it. Expressed as a 
percentage of GDP, the structural deficit is obtained from the difference between the global deficit and 
the cyclical deficit. The idea is that the structural or discretional deficit constitutes a suitable indicator of 
the fiscal trust: that is to say, the direction fiscal policy is taking. 
In the case of many Latin American countries, this information is not enough, because there are 
many sources of non-tax income, ranging from the profits of public enterprises that export commodities 
to the income from privatization operations; furthermore, the variation in tax income is also due to other 
variables, such as inflation. For this reason, the concept of the structural deficit, as defined earlier, may 
not be a good indicator of the trust of fiscal policy. Hereinafter, we will use the concept of cyclically 
adjusted balance with the same methodology developed in the European Commission (1995). 
Nonetheless, fixing deficit targets which are independent of other short-term oscillations (such as 
commodity prices) is of prime importance. It is also necessary to define what is “normal” for these forms 
of non-tax income. On the expenditure side, total elasticity in the OECD countries varies as a function of 
the size of the transfers provided for under the unemployment insurance legislation. These protection 
mechanisms are practically non-existent in Latin America, so there are virtually no expenditures or 
transfers automatically linked to the economic cycle. Consequently, cyclical expenditure is not taken 
into account in the calculations below. 
The usual cyclical indicator breaks down taxation into its main components (taxes on goods and 
services, on companies and on households) and econometrically estimates the respective income 
elasticities, whose values depend basically on the tax structure and the progressiveness of the system. In 
contrast, it may be assumed that indirect taxes have an elasticity (instantaneous) of one. 
The mean aggregate elasticity depends on the tax structure of the country. On average, the 
aggregate elasticity is near unity in OECD countries, with a standard deviation of 0.4, varying from 1.38 
for Great Britain to 0.77 for Italy (Giorno et al, 1995, Van der Noord, 2000). In countries where direct 
                                                                
11
  The recent Fiscal Responsibility Laws of Argentina (1999), Peru (2000), and Ecuador (2002), did set numerical targets for the annual 
deficits, eliminating by law the possibility of the free operation of automatic stabilizers. In the last two cases the targets of the Law 
had to be abandoned with the reversion of the cycle, hampering seriously the perception of commitment of fiscal policy. See Martner 
(2000) for a discussion. 
12
  For recent experiences in European countries, see EMU (2001) and Buti et al. (2003). The major budgeting innovations within the 
OECD countries are synthesized in Blondal (2003). 
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taxes predominate, this elasticity will be greater than unity, but in those where indirect taxes are more 
important this parameter is generally close to unity, on average. This should be the case of the Latin 
American countries. 
The high correlation between the changes in taxes and output can be seen for some countries in 
figure 14. In broad terms, the variations of tax revenues are more pronounced than the changes in output. 
Nonetheless, there are episodes were this correlation is even negative, reflecting perhaps changes in the 
legislation and also revealing the difficulty to estimate accurately this crucial parameter. On one hand, 
tax reforms, of which there have been many in the region in the recent past, change the rates or bases of 
the main taxes, thus making the econometric estimation of tax elasticities very difficult. On the other 
hand, tax elasticities are sensitive themselves to the business cycle, with tax revenues falling more 
rapidly than output during downturns and increasing more than proportionally during upswings. 
Figure 14 
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Crisis in Latin America are usually marked by drastic external adjustments in which private 
consumption –and above all its imported component– falls much more than GDP. In this case, the 
elasticity would be much greater than unity. The elasticity of VAT depends on the breakdown of 
private consumption between durable and non-durable goods (in a recession, consumption of 
durable goods goes down more sharply and the elasticity of VAT with respect to total consumption 
is therefore greater than unity at such times, if there are differentiated tax rates); on the elasticity of 
the volume of imports with respect to GDP (if this elasticity is greater than unity, the VAT collected 
on imported goods grows more rapidly than GDP); and on the relation between tax evasion and the 
economic cycle: aspects which are not usually taken into account in comparative analyses but which 
can be highly significant in some situations. Table 5 shows the quarterly estimates of the output 
elasticity of total tax incomes. 
Table 5  
TOTAL TAX REVENUES ELASTICITY ESTIMATION 
(Dependent Variable: Log of Total Tax Revenues) 





































R2  0.839 0.916 0.933 0.949 0.919 0.941 
F 26.07 127.9 86.9  120.6 68.2 
No of obs. 25 39 30 50 36 38 
Durbin Watson 1.67 2.07 1.53 2.01 1.50 1.84 
Solved static long run equation       












Source: Calculations of the authors.  
Notes: Test t by parenthesis. Seasonal effects were added in the estimations. 
 
As expected, the elasticity is greater than unity in five of the six cases. This might be a 
normal result in countries were the tax burden is low, like Bolivia (14.5% of GDP), Mexico (12.5% 
of GDP) and Peru (13.6% of GDP). The very high value of elasticity in the case of Argentina 
reflects the sharp reduction of tax incomes during the recession period, that can be explained by the 
strong decrease of imports (and tariffs of imports), by tax evasion and by social security reforms. In 
the case of Chile, the effect on tax incomes of the slowdown in GDP growth in recent years has 
been counter balanced with a very active anti-evasion policy. In Brazil the elasticity is lower than 
one, reflecting perhaps the fact that the tax burden is already very high.  
It is important to note that the indicator of cyclically adjusted balance is less sensitive to 
changes in the values of these elasticities than to changes in the measurements of the GDP gap 
(Giorno and Suyker, 1997). For the moment, we assume a unit income elasticity for all other 
countries. Under this hypothesis, the relative size of the cyclical deficit depends only on two 
factors: i) the gap between the effective and potential GDP, which measures the distance between 
the effective growth of the economy and its medium-term path, and ii) the weight of taxes in total 
public income, which represents the proportion of revenue directly linked to the level of activity. 
The marginal sensitivity of the public balance to changes in the level of activity is obtained 
by multiplying the aggregate elasticity by the rate of taxation. For the average tax rates in the 
region, which are of the order of 20%, the cyclical balance would be one point of GDP for an output 
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gap of 5% and two points for a gap of 10%. In other words, the semi-elasticity or sensitivity of the 
public balance to changes in the level of activity is close to 0.2 (for each percentage point of the 
GDP gap, the public balance varies by 0.2 points of GDP), compared with the value of 0.5 
calculated for both the European Union (Buti, Franco and Ongena, 1997), and the OECD on 
average (Van der Noord, 2000).  
Table 6 shows the marginal sensitivity of the public balance to changes in the level of activity 
in some OECD countries and in Latin America. It also shows the size of the GDP gap and the 
cyclical deficit, with their maximum and minimum values, for 1960-1996 in the case of Europe and 
1980-2001 in the case of Latin America. Estimation of the potential GDP with the Hodrick-Prescott 
method provides an elementary and immediate measure of macroeconomic fluctuations. According 
to the results obtained, the GDP gap (as a percentage of the potential GDP) varied between minima 
of -13% and maxima of 17% in countries such as Argentina, Peru, Chile and Uruguay in the 1980-
2001 period. In the European Union, in contrast, the same indicator measured by the same means 
rarely exceeded 4% of the trend GDP.  
This marked volatility of the level of activity has adverse consequences for the public deficit, 
even though the marginal sensitivity of the public balance in the region is far below that of the 
European Union. If we combine these two elements –tax rate and volatility of GDP– the application 
of this methodology to the Latin American countries brings out a cyclical component of the deficit 
which was significant in the 1990s, with values close to or higher than two points of GDP. It 
therefore seems worth estimating this component in order to evaluate the public accounts results 
properly. In Paraguay, Ecuador and Venezuela, in contrast, the cyclical component is only a little 
over 0.5 points of GDP. In Paraguay there were only moderate macroeconomic fluctuation, and in 
Ecuador and Venezuela the income from oil exports was equal to or greater than tax income. 
The cyclical component is relevant not only because of its importance in the annual budget 
but also because of its persistence over various periods. Many of the countries of Latin America 
register recent declines in their GDP growth and hence will exhibit strongly negative GDP gaps and 
cyclical fiscal balances in the near future (see figure 15). These were offset by a positive cyclical 
balance in previous years; the condition of symmetry applied in these calculations should be borne 
in mind. 
Such marked volatility of the level of activity has adverse consequences for the public deficit, 
and these are even greater when tax revenue represents a considerable proportion of public income. 
It is essential to identify a “sustainable” medium-term path and to formulate fiscal policy as a 
function of permanent sources of income generated when the economy is on its trend path. The 
magnitude of the automatic fiscal stabilizers and the uncertainty of the macroeconomic environment 
therefore shows the crucial importance of adopting prudent criteria regarding the management of 
the public finances, not so much in terms of precise annual deficit targets but rather in terms of 
simple and transparent rules which ensure their medium-term stability. 
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Table 6 
CYCLICAL COMPONENT OF PUBLIC BALANCE 
GDP gap 
(% of potential GDP) 
Cyclical component of 
public balance 









to GDP (2001) 2/ Minimum   Maximum Minimum Maximum 
Argentina 20.2 0.36 -13.0 (90) 9.4 (98) -4.9 (90) 4.3 (98) 
Bolivia  14.7 0.34 -0.7 (92) 4.9 (98) -0.3 (92) 2.6 (98) 
Brazil 35.1 0.35 -5.9 (92) 2.7 (97) -1.7 (92) 0.4 (97) 
Chile 18.7 0.22 -1.4 (01) 4.6 (97) -0.5 (01) 0.9 (97) 
Colombia 17.5 0.18 -2.9 (99) 4.6 (98) -0.5 (99) 0.8 (97) 
Costa Rica 19.5 0.20 -5.7 (82) 8.8 (80) -0.7 (82) 1.1 (99) 
Ecuador 18.8 0.19 -5.5 (99) 4.4 (97) -0.6 (00) 0.5 (97) 
El Salvador 12.9 0.13 -3.8 (91) 5.0 (95) -0.4 (91) 0.7 (95) 
Guatemala 11.1 0.11 -4.7 (86) 5.1 (81) -0.3 (86) 0.4 (81) 
Honduras 16.6 0.17 -3.1 (83) 3.4 (93) -0.5 (99) 0.6 (93) 
Mexico 12.5 0.24 -6.0 (95) 5.1 (00) -1.7 (95) 1.4 (00) 
Nicaragua 26.3 0.26 -6.8 (80) 6.9 (87) -1.2 (89) 2.1 (84) 
Panama 14.5 0.15 -12.9 (89) 7.0 (86) -1.1 (88) 0.9 (86) 
Paraguay 11.1 0.11 -4.5 (86) 5.1 (81) -0.3 (86) 0.4 (81) 
Peru 13.6 0.14 -11.2 (92) 15.9 (87) -1.6 (92) 1.5 (87) 
Dominican R. 16.3 0.16 -6.1 (91) 7.3 (00) -0.8 (91) 1.0 (00) 
Uruguay 23.2 0.23 -8.7 (84) 9.5 (81) -1.2 (85) 2.1 (98) 
Venezuela 9.4 0.09 -4.1 (90) 6.0 (92) -0.3 (99) 0.5 (97) 
Denmark 49.0 0.80 -3.6 (81) 3.8 (86) -2.4 (81) 2.6 (86) 
Sweden 53.2 0.65 -4.6 (93) 3.7 (90) -4.1 (93) 3.2 (90) 
Netherlands 39.9 0.65 -3.4 (83) 2.4 (74) 2.9 (83) 1.8 (74) 
Belgium 45.3 0.60 -2.9 (93) 2.0 (90) -2.1 (93) 1.3 (90) 
United Kingdom 37.4 0.50 -4.0 (82) 5.1 (88) -2.7 (82) 3.1 (89) 
Germany 36.4 0.50 -3.8 (67) 4.3 (91) -1.8 (67) 2.4 (91) 
Italia 41.8 0.45 -3.4 (75) 3.1 (80) -1.2 (75) 1.1 (80) 
France 45.4 0.40 -2.1 (85) 3.2 (90) -1.1 (85) 1.6 (90) 
Spain 35.2 0.40 -4.5 (60) 5.3 (74) -2.1 (85) 2.7 (90) 
Greece 40.8 0.40 -2.7 (94) 2.9 (89) -1.2 (94) 1.3 (89) 
Portugal 2/ 34.5 0.35 -1.8 (94) 3.4 (90) -0.7 (94) 1.2 (90) 
European Union 2/ 41.6 0.50 -2.2 (83) 3.2 (73) -1.3 (83) 1.6 (90) 
New Zealand 34.8 0.57 -5.2 (92) 1.9 (86) -3.2 (92) 1.3 (86) 
Canada 35.2 0.41 -4.6 (88) 4.0 (88) -2.3 (92) 1.7 (88) 
Australia 2/ 31.5 0.28 -2.8 (92) 2.1 (89) -0.9 (92) 0.6 (89) 
United States 2/ 29.6 0.25 -1.8 (91) 2.0 (89) -0.6 (91) 0.6 (89) 
Japan 2/ 27.1 0.26 -2.3 (95) 3.1 (91) -0.5 (95) 0.4 (91) 
OECD average 2/ 37.4 0.49 -4.6 (90) 2.7 (86) -3.1 (90) 1.6 (86) 
Source: Calculations of the authors for Latin American countries. European Commission (2002) for European countries. 
OECD (2000) for other OECD countries. For Tax Revenues for OECD countries: “Revenues Statistics 1965-2001”, OECD 
(2002 Edition) Central Government; General Government for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil; PS: Public Sector. 
1/ The marginal sensitivity is calculated multiplying tax burden in 2001 by tax revenue elasticity. Tax revenue elasticity is 
estimated in Table 7 for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru. For the other countries we assume that tax 
revenue elasticity is 1. 2/ 2000. 
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Figure 15  
CYCLICAL BALANCES OF SELECTED COUNTRIES 
(Percentage of GDP) 
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IV. Conclusion 
In this paper we emphasized the diversity of situations of public 
finances in Latin American countries. Clearly there are three groups of 
countries. In the first one the debt problem has already exploded 
(Argentina, Ecuador, Uruguay, Venezuela); these countries will have to 
generate or maintain for many years significant primary surplus and will 
have to be apply some kind of Sovereign debt restructuring mechanisms. 
A second group of countries live dangerously in a context of poor 
growth, volatile exchange rates and very high spreads, with an urgent 
need to put into operation (Colombia, Costa Rica) or to maintain and 
even enhance (Brazil, Peru) tight fiscal policies. The third group (Chile, 
Dominican Republic, Mexico) managed to reduce their stock debt in the 
nineties, hence applying anti-cyclical policies in the good times and 
permitting to face the cyclical reversion in better terms.  
Despite the substantial progress of tax systems in the last 
decade, there remain crucial issues that have to be addressed in the 
near future. In general terms, the situation is puzzling: the deceleration 
of economic growth and the reversion of capital flows has deteriorated 
the public finance situation, especially in terms of refinancing debt at 
reasonable interest rates. Meanwhile, the “tax gap”, significant in some 
cases, is very difficult to fulfill, mainly because of snowball effects 
that impede public expenditure adjustment and because of the 
impossible task of increasing tax revenues in crisis situations.  
At the domestic level, clearly in the medium term the 
enhancement of public finances can only be attained with a substantial 
improvement of tax levels, particularly through the reduction of tax 
evasion and the decline of generalized exemptions and other tax 
expenditure mechanisms. 
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But even if these duties were completed, the structural problem of public finance in Latin 
America remains, which is the significant vulnerability of tax collection to the economic cycle, and 
of course the high volatility of output itself. In this situation, it would be efficient to combine -
particularly in the agreements with IMF - credibility with flexibility in the design of fiscal rules, 
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